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GENERAL STREAM ADJUDICATIONS,
THE MCCARRAN AMENDMENT, AND
RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
Lawrence J. MacDonnell *
I. Introduction
General stream adjudications (GSAs) are special proceedings, usually judicial,
in which the priority and scope of the legal rights to all water uses from the
same source of supply are determined.1 GSAs are being used in many western
states to determine the existence and scope of both Indian and federal reserved
water rights.2 That state courts are determining federal rights is the product of the
McCarran Amendment, made law by Congress in 1952.3 Ordinarily, water rights
are established under state law.4 Reserved rights are a prominent exception. States
have long been concerned about these inchoate claims to use water and have
wanted to get them determined in order to integrate them administratively with
state-law water rights.5 The McCarran Amendment provides a mechanism for
this purpose.
A decision to enter into a GSA represents a major commitment of state
resources and involves the participation of many, if not all, existing water users
from the same source of water supply.6 GSAs are lengthy, contentious, and
* Senior Fellow at Getches-Wilkinson Center, University of Colorado School of Law. My
special thanks to Michael Blumm for his very helpful review and comments.
1

A. Dan Tarlock, Law of Water Rights & Resources § 7:2 [hereinafter Tarlock].

John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers and
Streams, Part II, 9 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 299 (2006) [hereinafter Thorson II].
2

3
Act of July 10, 1952, Pub. L. No. 945, 66 Stat. 560 (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 666
(2015)). See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
4

See, e.g., David H. Getches, Water Law in a Nutshell (4th ed. 2008).

5

Thorson II, supra note 2, at 305–06.

6

Id. at 366–67.
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complex proceedings that extend far beyond determination of tribal and federal
water claims.7 Nevertheless, most western states have decided they are worth
initiating and completing, even with their challenges.
While there are undoubted benefits to states to have Indian and federal
reserved rights determined, prioritized, and quantified, there appear to be serious
questions about having this determination occur in state courts. With nearly forty
years of experience it now appears that these courts are sometimes reaching widely
differing results, based on the manner in which they apply federal law—results
that are leading to a law of reserved rights that seems to vary from state to state
and that, in some cases, appears to frustrate the federal purposes intended to be
achieved under the reserved rights doctrine.
This article addresses the use of GSAs to determine both Indian and federal
reserved water rights. It begins in Part II with a brief summary of the reserved
rights doctrine.8 This part also includes a discussion of the McCarran Amendment
and the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court holding that state courts, as part of
properly structured GSAs, can determine and quantify Indian and federal reserved
water rights. Part III then examines all state appellate court decisions involving
the determination of reserved water rights as part of a GSA. It concludes that
GSAs in state courts are not appropriate forums for the determination of federal
and Indian reserved rights.9

II. The Reserved Rights Doctrine and the McCarran Amendment
The primary motive for most general stream adjudications in the past forty
years has been to determine and quantify federal and Indian reserved rights.10
The existence of such rights is outside state law and process, and their scope and
potential seniority place a cloud of uncertainty on uses established under state
law.11 The implied reserved rights doctrine is a product of federal common law, a
determination by the U.S. Supreme Court of an implied intent by the United States
when reserving federal lands to also reserve some portion of available water from

7

Id. at 464.

8

See infra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.

For a critique of general stream adjudications more generally, see Lawrence J. MacDonnell,
Rethinking the Use of General Stream Adjudications, 15 Wyo. L. Rev. 347 (2015) [hereinafter
Rethinking] (concluding that general stream adjudications are nineteenth century artifacts that are
expensive, cumbersome, time consuming, and not either necessary or appropriate for determining
state-law-based water rights).
9

10
Scott B. McElroy & Jeff J. Davis, Revisiting Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States–There Must be a Better Way, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 597, 612 (1995) [hereinafter McElroy
& Davis].
11

Thorson II, supra note 2, at 306–12.
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disposition under state law in order to enable fulfillment of federal objectives.12
It first emerged in the context of reservations of lands in which Indians were to
permanently reside—arid lands that require the use of large quantities of water to
live and establish a viable community and economy.13
The U.S. Supreme Court first announced this doctrine in its 1908 decision,
Winters v. United States.14 The Court determined that the treaty entered into
between the United States and two tribes creating the Fort Belknap Indian
Reservation along the Milk River in Montana impliedly reserved water necessary
to build and maintain a permanent homeland.15 This water had been set aside in
1888, at the time the treaty was signed.16 Appropriative rights established under
Montana law to this source of water were later in time and thus subject to the
prior tribal rights.17 The Court determined that the United States and tribes could
reserve this water even after a territory became a state.18
Congress attached the McCarran Amendment to an appropriations bill for
the Justice Department in 1952.19 The Amendment provided a waiver of federal
sovereign immunity in the event a state filed a “suit” for the adjudication of rights
to use the water of a “river system.”20 There is no mention of reserved water

12
See, e.g., Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976). For a thorough overview of
federal and Indian reserved rights law, see Robert E. Beck, Reserved Water Rights, in 4 Waters and
Water Rights, Ch. 37 (1991) [hereinafter Reserved Water Rights].
13

Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).

14

Id.

15

Id. at 575–76.

16

Id. at 576.

17

Id. at 577.

18

Id.

McElroy & Davis, supra note 10, at 601. This article discusses the concerns that motivated
adoption of this provision. Id. at 601–05; see also Michael Lieder, Adjudication of Indian Water Rights
Under the McCarran Amendment: Two Courts Are Better Than One, 71 Geo. L.J. 1023 (1982–1983).
19

20

Now codified at 43 U.S.C. § 666, it provides:
(a) Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the
adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for
the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner
of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by
purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such
suit. The United States, when a party to any such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have
waived any right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or that the United States
is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the
judgments, order, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review
thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances:
Provided, That no judgment for costs shall be entered against the United States in any
such suit.
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rights in the provision, and apparently there was little discussion of reserved rights
during the legislative process.21
In the 1963 Arizona v. California decision, the Court applied the Winters
doctrine to confirm the existence of reserved water rights for tribes with reservations
located along the mainstream of the Colorado River in Arizona, California, and
Nevada.22 The Court adopted the “practicably irrigable acreage” standard for
quantifying these rights, finding that the reservations had been established for
the purpose of setting aside permanent homelands for the tribes and that the
expectation was that irrigated agriculture would be a primary means for which
reservation lands would be used.23 Without analysis or discussion, the decision also
extended this doctrine to other federal land reservations, concluding that the same
principle of implied intent to achieve reservation purposes applied.24 The Court
found that reserved water rights had been created for a national recreation area
and two national wildlife refuges located along the lower Colorado River.25 The
Court also concluded that reserved rights had been established with the creation
of the Gila National Forest in New Mexico, but it did not attempt to quantify
these rights.26 The substantial quantities of water determined to be associated with
the Indian reserved water rights, together with the newly determined existence of
reserved rights associated with other reservation of federal lands, raised widespread
concern among the western states that water rights established under state law
would be displaced by senior Indian and federal reserved water rights.27
Sometime later in the 1960s, the United States found itself resisting joinder
under the McCarran Amendment in a supplemental adjudication proceeding in
Colorado for the purpose of determining its reserved water rights.28 Colorado had
long used a judicial adjudication process to verify the claims of appropriation of

21
McElroy & Davis, supra note 10, at 601 (“The history of the bill shows virtually no interest
on the part of Congress in the adjudication of Indian reserved rights.”).

Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599–600 (1963); see also National Water Commis
Water Policies for the Future: Final Report to the President and to Congress of the
United States 475 (1973).
22

sion,

23

Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600.

24

Id. at 595.

25

Id. at 601.

26

Id.

27

Western States Water Council, Indian Water Rights in the West: A Study (1984).

United States v. Dist. Ct. in and for the Cnty. of Eagle, 458 P.2d 760 (Colo. 1969). The
U.S. Supreme Court first considered the scope of the McCarran Amendment in Dugan v. Rank, 372
U.S. 609 (1963). Here, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a suit filed against the government by
downstream water users to prevent storage of water in Friant Dam failed because the United States
had not waived its sovereign immunity. 372 U.S. at 611. The Court noted that the suit did not
include all water users nor was it seeking the determination of priorities. Id. at 618.
28
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water.29 Now a Colorado court, in an adjudication instigated by the Colorado
River Water Conservation District, sought to join the United States for the
purpose of determining its reserved rights.30 The United States opposed joinder,
arguing the Colorado process did not meet the requirements of the McCarran
Amendment.31 Under the rule that only parties to an adjudication are bound by
its results, the United States noted that Colorado’s supplemental adjudication
proceedings did not include those whose rights had already been adjudicated and
did not allow the award of a priority earlier than all those already adjudicated.32
Thus, the court would be unable to recognize the earlier priorities associated with
reserved water rights.33 Moreover, because the Amendment refers to adjudications
of a “river system,” the United States argued that a state adjudication that does
not encompass an entire river and its tributaries does not meet this requirement.34
Finally, the United States argued that the McCarran Amendment did not give
state courts the authority to determine federal reserved rights.35
The case went first to the Colorado Supreme Court. In its review of the
McCarran Amendment, the court noted:
Our situation with respect to water rights has been that priorities
are decreed under state laws, but any water rights of the United
States in Colorado remain mysterious, largely unknown,
uncatalogued and unrelated to decreed water rights. This creates
an undesirable, impractical and chaotic situation. It was to

29

Robert G. Dunbar, Forging New Rights in Western Waters 92 (1983).

30

Cnty. of Eagle, 458 P.2d at 761.

31

Id.

32

Id. at 767.

Id. While the matter has not been litigated, the extent to which an adjudication must
include de minimis water users to satisfy the McCarran Amendment has been noted. Thorson II,
supra note 2, at 366– 67. Problematic are the large number of de minimis water users such as those
using domestic wells or stock water ponds. More potentially significant is whether users of tributary
groundwater must be included. See also Thomas H. Pacheco, How Big is Big? The Scope of Water
Rights Suits Under the McCarran Amendment, 15 Ecology L.Q. 627 (1988).
33

34
See, e.g., United States v. Dist. Ct. in and for the Cnty. of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520, 523 (1971);
In re Snake River Basin Water System, 764 P.2d 78, 86 (Idaho 1988); Elephant Butte Irrigation
Dist. v. Regents of N.M. State Univ., 849 P.2d 372, 373 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). The United
States has also questioned the use of administrative processes as part of an adjudication because
the Amendment specifies there must be a “suit.” United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758, 765 (9th
Cir. 1994). A consequence of these efforts to avoid application of the McCarran Amendment is
the belief that state adjudications have to be as comprehensive as possible, pushing states towards
establishing what have proved to be complex and challenging processes. See Thorson II, supra
note 2, at 368 (“Comprehensiveness is required for the waiver of sovereign immunity under the
McCarran Amendment.”).
35

See, e.g., United States v. Dist. Ct. for Eagle Cnty., 401 U.S. 520, 523–24 (1971).
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remedy this situation and similar ones in other states that caused
Congress to adopt the McCarran Amendment.36
The court decided that Colorado’s adjudication statute gave Colorado courts
“plenary” jurisdiction of the determination of all water rights in Colorado,
including those of the United States and including claims based on the reserved
rights doctrine.37 Such authority included the ability to adjudicate the actual
priorities of any reserved rights, even if those rights would then be senior to
state-law-based rights previously adjudicated.38 It further determined that the
adjudicatory court could ensure that any parties who might be affected by the
adjudication of the federal rights would be given notice of the proceeding.39
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld this decision, deciding that the McCarran
Amendment intended to enable state courts in general stream adjudications to
consider all federal claims, including those based on the reserved rights doctrine.40
It further determined that the Colorado adjudication qualified as a general stream
adjudication under the McCarran Amendment.41 It dismissed the argument
respecting the absence of all parties from the proceeding and the inability under
Colorado law to establish priorities in a supplemental adjudication senior to
those already adjudicated as too technical.42 In a companion case involving a
separate adjudication proceeding in Colorado instituted under a revised statutory
provision, the Supreme Court affirmed its views.43

36

Cnty. of Eagle, 458 P.2d at 765.

37

Id. at 772.

Id. (“The fact that our statutes do not provide for the adjudication of the rights of the
United States with priorities prior to the dates of later decrees does not mean that our district courts
in a water adjudication cannot determine the rights of the United States in relation to decreed water
rights. On the contrary, our district courts have that jurisdiction.”).
38

Id. at 774 (“As we hold that the district court has jurisdiction by reason of its plenary
powers, it follows that the court need not have a statutory provision for notice. After the United
States has filed its statements of claim in the district court, including the priority dates it seeks, the
court then can determine which claimants of adjudicated rights need be given notice and can specify
the manner that notice shall be given. Obviously, notice should be directed to those who might be
adversely affected if the prayers for relief of the United States were granted.”).
39

Eagle Cnty., 401 U.S. at 524. The Court rejected the argument that the adjudication did
not encompass an entire river system as required under the McCarran Amendment. Id. at 523 (“We
deem almost frivolous the suggestion that the Eagle and its tributaries are not a ‘river system’ within
the meaning of the Act. No suit by any State could possibly encompass all of the water rights in the
entire Colorado River which runs through or touches many States. The ‘river system’ must be read
as embracing one within the particular State’s jurisdiction.”).
40

41

401 U.S. at 525–26.

“We think that argument is extremely technical; and we decline to confine 43 U.S.C. § 666
so narrowly.” Id. at 525 (footnote omitted).
42

43

United States v. Dist. Ct. in and for Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527 (1971).
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In 1972, the United States filed suit in the Federal District Court for Colorado
to obtain determination of water rights of two tribes located on reservations in
the southwest portion of the state.44 Because proceedings that sought to join
the United States had been initiated in a Colorado court pursuant to that state’s
adjudication provision, the federal district court granted a motion to dismiss the
federal claims, citing the abstention doctrine.45 The U.S. Supreme Court held
that the McCarran Amendment had not taken away federal court jurisdiction to
determine federal water rights, but that the policy favoring avoidance of piecemeal
litigation and other considerations of judicial efficiency warranted dismissal in
this case in favor of the state process.46 Thus, for example, the Court noted the
location of the federal court in Denver while the Colorado court was located in
the area of the state in which the water claims existed.47 The Court expressly held
that Indian reserved rights could be determined in a general stream adjudication
consistent with the requirements of the McCarran Amendment.48
In Cappaert v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an injunction
against groundwater pumping on private lands adjacent to the Devil’s Hole
National Monument on the basis that the associated groundwater withdrawals
threatened the continued existence of the Desert Pupfish living in a pool of water
within the monument.49 The Court found that water necessary to sustain the
Pupfish had been reserved at the time the monument was created.50
Just two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the nature and scope
of the implied federal reserved right established when the Gila National Forest
was established in 1899.51 It reaffirmed the authority of the United States to
make such reservations of water, even following statehood.52 Noting, however,
the limited availability of water in the western states, its importance to the
economies of these states, and the history it found of congressional deference to
states on matters of water, the Court stated: “Each time this Court has applied
the ‘implied-reservation-of-water doctrine,’ it has carefully examined both the

44

Colo. River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).

Id. at 806. (The federal court asserted the McCarran Amendment had removed its
jurisdiction to consider such federal claims.).
45

46

Id. at 807–09, 819–20.

47

Id. at 820.

48

Id. at 811–12.

49

426 U.S. 128 (1976).

Id. at 147. In the words of the Court: “The implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine,
however, reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no
more.” Id. at 141.
50

51
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978). The Court had already decided that
reserved rights for the Gila National Forest existed. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).
52

New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 699–700.
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asserted water right and the specific purposes for which the land was reserved,
and concluded that without the water the purposes of the reservation would be
entirely defeated.”53 The Court then examined the purposes for establishment
of national forests stated in the 1987 Organic Act, finding these to be “securing
favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of
timber . . . .”54 The Court rejected claims for reserved rights for recreation and
wildlife protection as outside these purposes.55 The Court introduced the rule that
implied reserved rights can exist only if necessary to achieve the primary purposes
for which a reservation is established, not for secondary purposes.56
The authority of state courts to adjudicate Indian reserved water rights again
reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1983, this time in the context of whether
tribes themselves could be the subject of state court jurisdiction.57 The Court first
reviewed its ruling in Colorado River Conservation District, noting it had explicitly
determined that under the McCarran Amendment Indian reserved rights could
be determined in state courts.58 It then held that passage of the McCarran
Amendment had removed any potential barriers to state court jurisdiction over
federal and Indian water claims in a general stream adjudication.59
In its discussion of whether a different result should apply when it is a tribe
and not the United States that is being brought into state court, the Court
summarized the arguments supporting this view:
53

Id. at 700.

54

Id. at 706–07.

55

Id. at 711–12. For a strong critique of this holding, see Tarlock, supra note 1, § 9:53.

New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 715. This distinction arose in the context of the significance of the
Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, which expressly directed national forests to be managed
for recreation and wildlife protection.
56

57
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545 (1983). At issue here were
provisions in state constitutions explicitly acknowledging the exclusive authority of the United
States respecting lands set aside as Indian reservations within the boundaries of the state. Such
provisions were included in the Enabling Acts of Montana and Arizona in which the specific
disputes considered in this case arose. The language provided that the states,

agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to . . . all lands . . .
owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes; and that until the title thereto shall have
been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the
disposition of the United States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States. . . .
Id. at 556.
58

Id. at 550–51.

Id. at 564 (“But the Amendment was designed to deal with a general problem arising out
of the limitations that federal sovereign immunity placed on the ability of the States to adjudicate
water rights, and nowhere in its text or legislative history do we find any indication that Congress
intended the efficacy of the remedy to differ from one State to another.”). The other issue that had
arisen in the cases was the effect of a federal statute known as Public Law 280 addressing state court
jurisdiction of certain tribal matters.
59
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The United States and the various Indian respondents raise a
series of arguments why dismissal or stay of the federal suit is not
appropriate when it is brought by an Indian tribe and only seeks
to adjudicate Indian rights. (1) Indian rights have traditionally
been left free of interference from the States. (2) State courts
may be inhospitable to Indian rights. (3) The McCarran Amend
ment, although it waived United States sovereign immunity in
state comprehensive water adjudications, did not waive Indian
sovereign immunity. It is therefore unfair to force Indian
claimants to choose between waiving their sovereign immunity
by intervening in the state proceedings and relying on the United
States to represent their interests in state court, particularly in
light of the frequent conflict of interest between Indian claims
and other federal interests and the right of the Indians under
28 U.S.C. § 1362 to bring suit on their own behalf in federal
court. (4) Indian water rights claims are generally based on
federal rather than state law. (5) Because Indian water claims
are based on the doctrine of “reserved rights,” and take priority
over most water rights created by state law, they need not as a
practical matter be adjudicated inter sese with other water rights,
and could simply be incorporated into the comprehensive state
decree at the conclusion of the state proceedings.60
Acknowledging that each of these arguments “has a good deal of force,” the
Court nevertheless concluded: “If the state proceedings have jurisdiction over
the Indian water rights at issue here, as appears to be the case, then concurrent
federal proceedings are likely to be duplicative and wasteful, generating ‘additional
litigation through permitting inconsistent dispositions of property.’”61 Moreover,
the Court expressed concern about “unseemly” races to the courthouse and
potentially competing judgments.62 The Court added:
The McCarran Amendment, as interpreted in Colorado River,
allows and encourages state courts to undertake the task of
quantifying Indian water rights in the course of comprehensive
water adjudications. Although adjudication of those rights
in federal court instead might in the abstract be practical,
and even wise, it will be neither practical nor wise as long as
it creates the possibility of duplicative litigation, tension and

60

Id. at 566 – 67 (footnote omitted).

Id. at 567 (quoting Colo. River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
819 (1976).
61

62

Id. at 567– 68.
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controversy between the federal and state forums, hurried and
pressured decisionmaking, and confusion over the disposition of
property rights.63
In short, the Court majority in both Colorado River District and San Carlos Apache
seems far more concerned with matters of federalism and deference to state court
jurisdiction than with the consequences of this deference for tribal or federal
interests. It bases this view on its interpretation of the McCarran Amendment,
a rider attached to an appropriations bill enacted prior to the emergence of state
concerns about the extent of tribal reserved rights and prior to the determination
that other federal land reservations might hold reserved water rights.64 It has
prompted western states to initiate GSAs, simply for the purpose of being able to
determine the existence and scope of Indian and federal reserved rights in state
courts.65 It has given life to an archaic judicial process that had all but disappeared
from states that had developed their own procedures for determining the priority
and extent of water rights established under state statutory provisions.66 It adopts
the mistaken assumption that federal and Indian reserved water rights can only
be determined in a GSA involving all users of water from the same source when,
in fact, the existence and extent of such reserved rights is in no way dependent on
other uses of water from the same source.67
The existence of an implied reserved right is determined solely on the basis of
a consideration of the purposes for which a federal reservation of land is made and
whether the achievement of those purposes requires the use of water.68 Assuming
it is determined the reservation purposes do require the use of water, the existence
of the reserved water right dates from the creation of the reservation.69 As in the
Winters case, those with state-law-based water rights established subsequent to
such reservations are necessarily junior in priority and must limit their uses as
necessary to ensure the reserved rights are met.70

Id. at 569. Later, the Court stated: “But water rights adjudication is a virtually unique type
of proceeding, and the McCarran Amendment is a virtually unique federal statute, and we cannot
in this context be guided by general propositions.” Id. at 571.
63

The existence of other kinds of federal reserved rights was not made clear until 1963 in
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).
64

See, e.g., Jason A. Robison, Wyoming’s Big Horn General Stream Adjudication, 15 Wyo. L.
Rev. 243, 267– 69 (2015) (Big Horn adjudication).
65

66
A more complete examination of general stream adjudications is provided in Rethinking,
supra note 8.
67
Id. As an illustration of a legal process determining Indian reserved rights not involving a
general adjudication, see United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983).
68

See, e.g., Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976).

69

See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).

70

Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol15/iss2/3
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Integration of reserved water rights with state water rights has proved
problematic. Numerous legal issues have arisen that plague such efforts including
determining the purposes for which reservations were established, whether these
purposes require water for their fulfillment, how much water was reserved and
how that is determined, whether groundwater was reserved, what uses to which
this water can be put, who determines present and future uses, who administers
these uses, how disputes between uses of reserved rights and state-authorized uses
are addressed, and what legal differences exist between federal reserved water
rights and Indian reserved rights.71 The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to allow
state courts to determine these complex issues in the context of general stream
adjudications unsurprisingly has produced different results.72 As a consequence,
the meaning of federal law now sometimes depends on the state. The Court
initially dismissed concerns that state courts might not treat these claims fairly.73
When once again presented with this issue, the Court stated:
State courts, as much as federal courts, have a solemn obligation
to follow federal law. Moreover, any state court decision alleged
to abridge Indian water rights protected by federal law can
expect to receive, if brought for review before this Court, a
particularized and exacting scrutiny commensurate with the
powerful federal interest in safeguarding those rights from
state encroachment.74
Justice Stevens, in dissent, responded:
Not all of the issues arising from the application of the Winters
doctrine have been resolved, because in the past the scope of
Indian reserved rights has infrequently been adjudicated. The
important task of elaborating and clarifying these federal law issues
in the cases now before the Court, and in future cases, should be
performed by federal rather than state courts whenever possible.75
71

The current state of the law in this area is presented in Reserved Water Rights, supra

note 12.
72

See supra notes 38–46, 55– 61 and accompanying text.

Colo. River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 812 (1976) (“The Govern
ment has not abdicated any responsibility fully to defend Indian rights in state court, and Indian
interests may be satisfactorily protected under regimes of state law.”). Justice Stewart, in dissent,
noted these are issues of federal law, that federal courts are more likely to be familiar with these
laws, that there is appellate court review available so that conflicts need not only be reviewable
by the U.S. Supreme Court under its certiorari jurisdiction, and that “a federal court is a more
appropriate forum than a state court for determination of questions of life-and-death importance to
Indians.” Id. at 825–26 (Stewart, J., dissenting). For a thoughtful discussion of this decision and its
implications for tribes, see McElroy & Davis, supra note 9.
73

74

Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983).

75

Id. at 573.
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Experience supports Justice Stevens’ concern.76 It is useful to recall these words of
Justice Brennan:
We also emphasize, as we did in Colorado River, that our decision
in no way changes the substantive law by which Indian rights in
state water adjudications must be judged. State courts, as much
as federal courts, have a solemn obligation to follow federal law.
Moreover, any state court decision alleged to abridge Indian
water rights protected by federal law can expect to receive, if
brought for review before this Court, a particularized and
exacting scrutiny commensurate with the powerful federal
interest in safeguarding those rights from state encroachment.77

III. Experience with State Adjudication of Reserved Rights
The appellate courts of eight states have decided cases involving substantive
aspects of federal/Indian reserved rights.78 What is particularly striking about
reading these cases is that, while they all tend to state the general principles of the
reserved rights doctrine as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court with reasonable
consistency, they have applied these principles with considerable variation,
sometimes directly inconsistently.79 The result is the emergence of a law of federal
and Indian reserved rights that is, in some cases, particularly distinctive to the
state in which the decisions are being made—differing state law versions of a
federal law.
This part provides a summary of these decisions on a state-by-state basis, more
or less according to the chronology of the major decisions. It separates treatment
of Indian reserved rights from other federal reserved rights. It then discusses some
of the important doctrinal results that have been reached and compares results
across the states. It begins with decisions of the New Mexico Supreme Court.

76

See infra notes 178–233 and accompanying text.

77

San Carlos Apache, 463 U.S. at 571.

This article only treats those cases involving substantive issues of law that required some
interpretation of principles previously articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court. It omits discussion of
In re Determination of Rights to Water of Hallett Creek Stream System because of the sui generis nature
of the issue in this case. 44 Cal. 3d 448, 749 P.2d 324 (1988) (finding that the U.S. held riparian
rights for national forests in the state).
78

An analysis of the Idaho adjudication court’s decision relating to Indian water rights claims
in that state makes this point as well. See Michael C. Blumm et al., Judicial Termination of Treaty
Water Rights: The Snake River Case, 36 Idaho L. Rev. 449, 453 (2000).
79
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A. New Mexico
In 1977, the New Mexico Supreme Court decided that the purposes for which
the Gila National Forest was established did not include recreation and rejected
a claim for implied reserved water rights for instream flows to support aesthetic,
environmental, recreational, and fish purposes.80 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld
this determination in United States v. New Mexico.81
A state process to adjudicate all rights to use the waters of the Rio Hondo
system, initiated in 1973, involved the reserved rights of the Mescalero Apache
Tribe.82 The New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the State’s jurisdiction to
consider Indian reserved rights in the adjudication process.83 In the adjudication,
the United States and the Mescalero Apache Tribe claimed a right to 17,750
acre-feet of water with a priority date of time immemorial or 1852, based on the
treaty entered into between the Apaches and the United States in that year.84 The
district court, however, awarded the Tribe a total of 2,322.4 acre-feet with an 1873
priority date.85 The New Mexico Court of Appeals determined instead that the
priority date should be the 1852 treaty but upheld the trial court’s quantification
of rights.86
In 1993 the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld joinder of the Unites States
in an adjudication proceeding including only that portion of the Rio Grande
downstream from Elephant Butte Reservoir to the Texas border, despite finding
that this segment did not constitute a “river system” as provided in the McCarran
Amendment.87 The court found that the interstate compact regulating deliveries
to Texas only in this portion of the Rio Grande warranted an “exception” to the
McCarran Amendment.88

B. Colorado
In 1971 the U.S. Supreme Court decided that Colorado’s system of continuing
adjudication of water rights met the requirements of the McCarran Amendment
80

Mimbres Valley Irr. Co. v. Salopek, 90 N.M. 410, 412, 564 P.2d 615, 617 (1977).

81

455 U.S. 720 (1982).

82

State ex rel. Reynolds v. Lewis, 88 N.M. 636, 545 P.2d 1014 (1976).

83

Id. at 640, 545 P.2d at 1018.

84

State ex rel. Martinez v. Lewis, 116 N.M. 194, 197, 861 P.2d 235, 238 (1993).

85

Id.

The quantification dispute turned on the differences in view respecting the practicably
irrigable acreage analysis. The Tribe submitted evidence respecting two water development projects
that the trial court found not economically feasible. Id., at 209, 861 P.2d at 250.
86

87
Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. v. Regents of New Mexico State Univ., 115 N.M. 229,
235–36, 849 P.2d 372, 378–79 (1993).
88

Id.
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so that state water court proceedings could determine federal reserved water
rights.89 In 1972, the United States sought to adjudicate certain federal reserved
rights in the Colorado federal district court. The federal district court determined
that, under the abstention doctrine, the United States claims should be heard in
an ongoing state court proceeding.90 In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the McCarran Amendment did not remove federal district court jurisdiction91
but that principles of “wise judicial administration” warranted dismissal of the
federal case in favor of the state proceeding.92 The Court also affirmed that
Indian reserved water rights may be determined in McCarran Amendment state
general adjudications.93
Federal claims for reserved rights in Water Divisions 4, 5, and 6 reached the
Colorado Supreme Court in 1982.94 The water court had ruled that federal reserved
rights for national forests were subordinate to all state-based appropriations
within the forests.95 The Colorado Supreme Court rejected this holding, noting
that reserved rights are regarded as having a priority as of the date the reservation
was established and that any subsequent appropriations are necessarily junior
to such federal rights.96 The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the water court’s
rejection of United States claims for instream flows for recreational, scenic, and
wildlife protection purposes in national forests, citing to the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in United States v. New Mexico.97 The United States had argued that the
Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960, which declared that national forests
are established and are to be administered for the “supplemental” purposes of
outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish, impliedly
reserved water necessary to accomplish those purposes.98 Since it had not asserted
reserved rights on this basis in New Mexico, the United States argued this issue had
not yet been decided.99 The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed, holding that this
issue had been decided in New Mexico.100
89
United States v. Dist. Ct. in and for the Cnty. of Eagle 401 U.S. 520 (1971); see also United
States v. Dist. Court in and for Water Div. No. 5, Colorado, 401 U.S. 527 (1971).
90

Colo. River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 806 (1976).

91

Id. at 809.

Id. at 817. The Court, however, rejected the federal district court’s adoption of the
abstention doctrine as a basis for dismissing the case. Id. at 813–16.
92

93

Id. at 810.

94

United States v. City and Cnty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982).

95

Id. at 13–14.

96

Id. at 21.

97

Id. at 22–23.

98

Id. at 24.

In New Mexico, the United States had argued the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act
supported its view that instream flows had been reserved under the 1897 Organic Act. It had not
asserted reserved rights on the basis of this 1960 act.
99

100

Denver, 656 P.2d at 24–26.
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The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the water court determination that
the reservation of Dinosaur National Monument had not reserved water for
recreational uses.101 Its examination of the authorizing language found only
scientific and historic purposes, not recreational.102 It rejected United States
arguments that placing the supervision of the monument under the Park Service
in 1938 broadened the reservation’s purposes to include those authorized for
national parks.103
The water court had ruled that the withdrawal of public lands in 1926
containing water holes and springs reserved only the amount of water required
for stock watering and drinking uses, and only for those sources determined to
be nontributary to surface water.104 The Colorado Supreme Court agreed that
the reservation governed only the minimum amount necessary for these purposes
and that any additional uses of this water are governed by state law.105 It rejected,
however, the water court’s restriction of reservation only to nontributary water,
finding no support in the withdrawal order of such intention.106 Finally, the
Colorado Supreme Court upheld the water court’s determination that reserved
rights existed for mineral hot springs withdrawn under federal law, but that the
reservation did not extend to the use of these hot springs for power production.107
In United States v. Bell, the Colorado Supreme Court determined that
the United States was bound by Colorado’s postponement doctrine so that its
amendment of its original filing meant that its claims could not relate back to
the original filing date.108 It further rejected the attempt to amend its claim to
assert reserved rights in sources of water not located directly in or on the reserved
federal lands.109
In United States v. Jesse, the Colorado Supreme Court overruled a water court
decision that instream flows cannot be reserved for national forests as a matter of

101
Id. at 26. The Court stated that determination of this matter “is particularly important
in this context because of the enormous potential economic impact of minimum stream flows on
vested and conditional Colorado water rights.” Id. at 27.
102

Id. at 27–28.

103

Id. at 28.

104

Id. at 31.

Id. at 31–32 (“It appears to us that the reservation documents indicate no intent to reserve
the entire yield of public springs and waterholes involved here.”).
105

106

Id. at 32–33.

Id. at 33–34. Congress had authorized the leasing of federally-owned geothermal resources
for power production in 1970.
107

108
United States v. Bell, 724 P.2d 631, 634 (Colo. 1986). The postponement doctrine holds
that the decreed date of a water right determines its priority, not the time at which the appropriation
was initiated. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-306.
109

Bell, 724 P.2d at 639.
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law, and that the City of Denver decision collaterally estopped the United States
from asserting this claim in another proceeding.110 Here the federal government
was asserting that new science supported the need for instream flows to maintain
channels within the forests to meet the Organic Act’s watershed purpose.111 The
court noted that New Mexico rejected the United States claim because it had failed
to demonstrate the need for instream flows, but that here the federal government
was attempting to do just that.112
In a case involving quantification of reserved rights for the Black Canyon
of the Gunnison, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the water court’s
decision to postpone its process until resolution of a case pending in federal
district court disputing the federal government’s quantification process.113 It
found the federal case dealt with matters of federal law independent of the state
court adjudication process.114

C. Wyoming
The matter of Indian reserved water rights for the Wind River Reservation
reached the Wyoming Supreme Court in 1988. In its decision, the court upheld the
trial court’s determination that the 1868 treaty creating the reservation impliedly
reserved appurtenant water, and that subsequent actions had not abrogated that
intent.115 Based on its reading of the treaty, the court decided the sole purpose for
which the reservation was established was agriculture.116 The court determined
that implied reserved water rights for the reservation did not extend to underlying
groundwater.117 The court applied the practicably irrigable acreage measure to
quantify the tribes’ reserved rights to water for agricultural purposes.118 Finally,
the court upheld the district court’s order that disputes between state water users
and the tribes should first go to the State Engineer for resolution rather than to
the courts.119

110

United States v. Jesse, 744 P.2d 491 (Colo. 1987).

111

Id. at 493.

112

Id. at 502–03.

113

In re Application for Water Rights of the U.S., 101 P.3d 1072 (Colo. 2004).

114

Id. at 1080.

In re The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System,
753 P.2d 76, 90–94 (Wyo. 1988) (Big Horn I ).
115

116
Id. at 99. The Special Master had determined that the purpose of the reservation was to
establish a permanent homeland for the Indians. Id. at 94. The district court ruled instead that the
sole purpose was agriculture. Id. at 95.
117

Id. at 100.

118

Id. at 100–01.

119

Id. at 115.
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In 1992, the Wyoming Supreme Court considered whether the tribes could
change the use of that portion of their reserved water rights determined available
for future irrigation activities to instream flow uses.120 In a highly splintered set of
opinions, the court determined the tribes could not make such a change of use.121
In 2002, the Wyoming Supreme Court determined that non-Indian purchasers
of Indian allotments could claim a reserved right with an 1868 priority date even
though actual irrigation use had not occurred until from ten to twenty years after
purchase.122 Under the standard developed in the Walton case, for allotted lands
to have a reserved right it is necessary that either the Indian allotment owner had
irrigated the land or that the non-Indian purchaser had initiated irrigation within
a reasonable time following purchase.123

D. Washington
The State of Washington initiated a general adjudication in the Yakima River
basin in 1977.124 The Yakama Indian Reservation is located in the basin so the
adjudication addressed the nature and extent of the Indian reserved rights impliedly
reserved under the 1855 Stevens Treaty that established the reservation.125 A Ninth
Circuit Court decision in 1956 had previously determined the existence of Indian
reserved water rights in a tributary to the Yakima River.126 The court decided:
[T]he paramount right of the Indians to the waters of Ahtanum
Creek was not limited to the use of the Indians at any given date
but this right extended to the ultimate needs of the Indians as
those needs and requirements should grow to keep pace with the
development of Indian agriculture upon the reservation.127

In re The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System,
835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992) (Big Horn III).
120

121
Id. at 278. Because of the varying opinions, there is no majority rule governing why the
tribes cannot make this change of use. The trial court had supported the tribes’ ability to make this
change of use, following procedures established under tribal code. Id. at 276.

In re The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System,
48 P.3d 1040, 1046–51 (2002).
122

123

Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 51 (9th Cir. 1981).

State, Dep’t of Ecology v. Acquavella, 674 P.2d 160, 161 (Wash. 1983); see generally Sidney
P. Ottem, The General Adjudication of the Yakima River: Tributeries for the Twenty-First Century and
a Changing Climate, 23 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 275 (2008).
124

125

State, Dep’t of Ecology v. Yakima Reservation Irr. Dist., 850 P.2d 1306 (Wash. 1993).

126

United States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1956).

127

Id. at 327.
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In 1993 the Washington Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s rulings respecting
Indian reserved rights. The court largely upheld the trial court determinations
respecting the quantities of water available to the tribe for irrigation on the
reservation, based on previous Secretarial actions, acts of Congress, and other
litigation.128 The court also decided that these previous determinations had not
abrogated the Tribe’s implied rights to water necessary to maintain fisheries in the
basin, although it agreed with the trial court that the right had been “substantially
diminished.”129 The Washington Supreme Court affirmed without discussing the
trial court determination that “[t]he maximum quantity to which the Indians
are entitled as reserved treaty rights is the minimum instream flow necessary
to maintain anadromous fish life in the river, according to annual prevailing
conditions. This diminished reserved right for water for fish has a priority date
of time immemorial.”130 According to one source, “[t]he Yakama Nation retains
the right to have the state court enforce minimum flows under prior orders in the
Acquavella adjudication, but to date it has not had to do so.”131

E. Arizona
As the late Professor Feller explained in a 2007 article, the Gila River Basin
adjudication began in 1974, initiated by the Salt River Valley Water Users
Association in an effort to curtail junior users in the Verde River from diverting

Yakima, 850 P.2d at 1306 (1993). The trial court had considered the effect of a Secretarial
order in 1906 limiting diversions of water for irrigation on the reservation, a 1914 Congressional
act enlarging these diversion rights, Warren Act contracts for water from the Yakima Reclamation
Project, and a 1945 consent decree in a case in which the United States was representing the tribe.
Based on its analysis of these various actions, it established quantifications for tribal irrigation rights
without going through the usual practicably irrigable acreage analysis.
128

129

As summarized by the Washington Supreme Court:
The trial court found insufficient evidence to conclude that the rights to water for
fulfillment of treaty fishing rights had been extinguished, but found that those rights
had been substantially diminished and that generally the rights to water for fishing
purposes were subordinate to other irrigation rights. The trial court held, however,
that the Indians were entitled to the minimum instream flow which is necessary
to maintain anadromous fish life in the river. The trial court held that the specific
amount which is necessary for fish life should be determined according to the annual
prevailing conditions as determined by the Project Superintendent in consultation
with the Yakima River Basin Systems Operations Advisory Committee, Irrigation
Districts and company managers and others.

Id. at 1318–19.
According to Professor Blumm and his co-authors, “This unprecedented interpretation of
diminishing—or partially abrogating—treaty rights, despite a lack of clear intent to abrogate, was
inconsistent with Supreme Court standards.” Michael C. Blumm, et al., The Mirage of Indian
Reserved Water Rights and Western Streamflow Restoration in the McCarran Amendment Era: A Promise
Unfulfilled, 36 Envtl. L. 1157, 1180 (2006) [hereinafter Mirage].
130

Yakima, 850 P.2d at 1310.

131

Mirage, supra note 129, at 1181–82.
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water out of priority.132 Litigation challenging consideration of Indian reserved
rights in this adjudication ultimately reached the U.S. Supreme Court, resulting
in a 1983 decision holding that determination of Indian reserved rights should be
made in the ongoing state proceeding.133
In 1999 the Arizona Supreme Court issued its first substantive ruling
respecting Indian reserved rights in the Gila River Adjudication.134 In particular,
it addressed two issues raised on interlocutory appeal: whether federal reserved
rights extend to groundwater and whether such groundwater rights have greater
protection than state water rights.135 The court noted that reserved rights had not
previously been extended to groundwater and that the Wyoming Supreme Court
in the Big Horn Adjudication had decided that groundwater underlying the Wind
River Reservation was not included in tribal reserved rights.136 Nevertheless the
court concluded:
In summary, the cases we have cited lead us to conclude that
if the United States implicitly intended, when it established
reservations, to reserve sufficient unappropriated water to meet
the reservations’ needs, it must have intended that reservation of
water to come from whatever particular sources each reservation
had at hand. The significant question for the purpose of the
reserved rights doctrine is not whether the water runs above or
below the ground but whether it is necessary to accomplish the
purpose of the reservation.137
The court restricted its ruling to general principles since it was not making
specific determinations for individual reservations.138 Because of the unique

Joseph M. Feller, The Adjudication that Ate Arizona Water Law, 49 Ariz. L. Rev. 405
(2008); see also the background on this litigation provided in McElroy & Davis, supra note 9,
at 613–24.
132

133

Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983).

In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and
Source, 989 P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1999) (Gila River); see also Mirage, supra note 126, at 1186–87.
134

135

Gila River, 989 P.2d at 741.

136

Id. at 745.

137

Id. at 747.

Id. at 748 (“We decide this issue in the abstract at this time as a necessary step in determining
the scope of interests to be encompassed by this adjudication. We do not, however, decide that any
particular federal reservation, Indian or otherwise, has a reserved right to groundwater. A reserved
right to groundwater may only be found where other waters are inadequate to accomplish the
purpose of a reservation.”).
138
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purpose of federal reserved rights for achieving the purpose of the reservation, the
court also held that such rights have more protection than state-based rights from
impairment by off-reservation water uses.139
In 2001 the Arizona Supreme Court addressed the proper standard for
quantifying Indian reserved water rights.140 The trial court had applied the
practicably irrigable acreage measure, adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Arizona v. California.141 In its discussion, the court articulated what it believed was
a critical distinction between reserved rights for non-Indian federal reservations
and for Indian reservations. According to the court, the primary purpose of a
non-Indian federal reservation is to be defined strictly, but the federal government has unlimited discretion in its use and disposition of such reserved rights.142
The purposes of Indian reserved rights are, the court stated, viewed broadly “in
order to further the federal policy of Indian self-sufficiency.”143 Thus, irrespective
of treaty language or other documentation, the Arizona Supreme Court decided
that the purpose of all Indian reservations was “to provide Native American people
with a ‘permanent home and abiding place,’ that is, a ‘livable’ environment.”144
Following that same line of thinking, the court determined the primary/
secondary distinction developed in United States v. New Mexico in relation to the
purposes for which national forests were reserved does not apply in the context of
Indian reservations.145
Next, the court examined the practicably irrigable acreage standard adopted
by the trial court for quantifying Indian reserved water rights.146 It rejected this

139

Id. at 749–50.

In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and
Source, 35 P.3d 68 (Ariz. 2001).
140

141

Id. at 71.

Id. at 73–74 (citing State of Montana ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes, 712 P.2d 754, 767 (Mont. 1985)) (“[T]he United States can lease, sell, quitclaim, release,
encumber or convey its own federal reserved water rights.”).
142

143

Id. at 73–74 (quoting Greely, 712 P.2d at 768).

Id. at 73–74 (quoting Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 565 (1908), Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546, 599 (1963)).
144

145
“It is true that some courts have utilized the primary-secondary purpose test or looked to
it for guidance when dealing with Indian lands. Nevertheless, we believe the significant differences
between Indian and non-Indian reservations preclude application of the test to the former.” Id. at
76 (citing United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1408 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that New Mexico is
not directly applicable, but establishes “several useful guidelines”), Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying the test), In re the General Adjudication of all
Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 835 P.2d 273, 278–79 (Wyo.1992) (Big Horn
II ) (following the test)).

In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and
Source, 35 P.3d 68, 78–80 (Ariz. 2001).
146
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approach, noting the potential adverse consequences for tribes living on largely
nonirrigable lands, the notion that reserved rights are only for irrigation thus
forcing tribes to pursue undesired irrigation projects to be able to use their water
rights, and the potential for allocating too much water to tribes.147 In its place the
court adopted a multiple-factor analysis tailored specifically to each reservation.148
Among the factors to be considered, the court mentioned the use of master land
use plans with specific uses of water identified and quantified, tribal history, tribal
culture, the geography, topography, and natural resources of reservation lands, its
economic base, past water uses, and population.149 Responding to state arguments
respecting the need to apply the so-called sensitivity doctrine, the court stated:
The court’s function is to determine the amount of water
necessary to effectuate this purpose, tailored to the reservation’s
minimal need. We believe that such a minimalist approach
demonstrates appropriate sensitivity and consideration of
existing users’ water rights, and at the same time provides a
realistic basis for measuring tribal entitlements.150
In a 2012 opinion, the Arizona Supreme Court considered whether federal
reserved water rights attached to federal lands given to the State at statehood (state
trust lands).151 Concluding they did not, the court found that state trust lands
had not been withdrawn or reserved and that there is no indication that Congress
intended to reserve water necessary to carry out the purposes of these lands.152

147

Id. at 78–79.

148

Id. at 79.

149

Id. at 80. The Court added:
[T]he foregoing list of factors is not exclusive. The lower court must be given the
latitude to consider other information it deems relevant to determining tribal water
rights. We require only that proposed uses be reasonably feasible. As with PIA, this
entails a two-part analysis. First, development projects need to be achievable from
a practical standpoint—they must not be pie-in-the-sky ideas that will likely never
reach fruition. Second, projects must be economically sound. When water, a scarce
resource, is put to efficient uses on the reservation, tribal economies and members are
the beneficiaries.

Id. at 81.
Id. The sensitivity doctrine calls for consideration of the impact of quantification of Indian
reserved rights on existing, state-based water users.
150

151
In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and
Source, 289 P.3d 936 (Ariz. 2012).
152

Id. at 945.
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F. Idaho
In the 1970s, Idaho irrigators filed suits seeking adjudication of rights to
certain water sources.153 The United States intervened in these cases, asserting
federal reserved rights “in amounts reasonably necessary and sufficient to carry
out the limited purposes for which the forest service lands were reserved; namely
timber management and production and related purposes, including fish and
wildlife management, livestock grazing and recreational activities.”154 In 1974,
the Idaho Supreme Court concluded: “We hold that under 43 U.S.C. § 666,
the United States is bound by Idaho state law, and therefore must quantify the
amount of water claimed under the reservation doctrine at the time of the general
adjudication of water rights.”155 In 1978, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that
national forests had been established only for the purposes of timber production
and watershed management and ordered the United States to quantify its claims
on the basis of these purposes.156
The State of Idaho initiated the Snake River Basin Adjudication in 1987.157
The United States filed approximately 25,000 reserved water rights claims.158 Six
disputes related to these claims made it to the Idaho Supreme Court.159 In the 1998
decision, United States v. State of Idaho, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld federal
claims for reserved rights associated with lands withdrawn for stock watering.160
In United States v. City of Challis, the Idaho Supreme Court denied the claim of
the United States for reserved rights based on the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield
Act of 1960.161 In 1989, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld federal reserved rights
claims for two wilderness areas and one national recreation area.162 A year later,
the court reversed itself, deciding that the purposes of the Wilderness Act did not
Avondale Irrigation Dist. v. North Idaho Properties, Inc., 523 P.2d 818 (Idaho 1974)
(Avondale I ); Avondale Irrigation Dist. v. North Idaho Properties, Inc. 577 P.2d 9 (1978) (Avondale
II ) (consolidating Soderman v. Kackley).
153

154

Avondale I, 523 P.2d at 818.

155

Id. at 821–22.

156

Avondale II, 577 P.2d at 17.

Clive J. Strong, The First Twenty Years of the Snake River Basin Adjudication: Is There an
End in Sight?, 50 Advocate (Idaho) 14 (Jan. 2007) [hereinafter Strong]. The State finalized the
adjudication on August 25, 2014. Brian Smith, As Water Rights Review Closes, Management Questions
Loom, Twin Falls Times News, Aug. 26, 2014; Clive J. Strong, SRBA Retrospective: A 27-Year Effort,
57 Advocate (Idaho) 28 (Dec. 2014).
157

158

Strong, supra note 157, at 14.

159

Id.

United States v. State of Idaho, 959 P.2d 449, 450 (Idaho 1998). The court concluded:
“We hold that PWR 107 is a valid basis for a federal reserved water right for the limited purpose of
stockwatering.” Id. at 453.
160

161

United States v. City of Challis, 988 P.2d 1125 (Idaho 1999).

In re SRBA, Case No. 39576—Wilderness Reserved Claims, 1999 WL 778325 (not
reported in Pacific 3d.).
162
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require reserved water rights.163 Also that year, the court upheld federal reserved
rights for two wild and scenic rivers.164 In still another decision that year, the court
denied a federal reserved right for the Sawtooth National Recreation Area.165 The
following year the court denied a reserved rights claim for the Deer Flat National
Wildlife Refuge.166

G. Montana
The State of Montana initiated a statewide adjudication of water rights in
1979.167 As of 2007, approximately 219,000 claims had been filed.168 In 1984, the
State asked the Montana Supreme Court to determine whether the adjudication
procedures under Montana’s Water Use Act were sufficient to enable determination
of federal and Indian reserved water rights.169 In an extensive 1985 decision,
the Montana Supreme Court decided that state law and procedures enabled
consideration of federal and Indian reserved water rights.170 The court provided
a lengthy comparison of Indian reserved water rights and state appropriative
water rights, concluding that state law and procedure could adequately reflect
these differences.171 The court then compared federal reserved rights and state
appropriative rights, as well as federal and Indian reserved rights.172
163
Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260 (Idaho 2000); see Michael C. Blumm,
Reversing the Winters Doctrine?: Denying Reserved Water Rights for Idaho Wilderness and Its Implica
tions, 73 U. Colo. L. Rev. 173 (2002) [hereinafter Blumm]; see also Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., State
Water Politics Versus an Independent Judiciary: The Colorado and Idaho Experiences, 5 U. Denv.
Water L. Rev. 122 (2001). The original decision prompted a political firestorm in Idaho, resulting
in the defeat for reelection of the justice who authored the decision.
164
Potlatch, 12 P.3d at 1256 (holding the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act creates an express federal
reserved right).
165
State of Idaho v. United States, 12 P.3d 1284 (2000) (legislation establishing Sawtooth
NRA “for the preservation and protection of the natural, scenic, historic, pastoral, and fish and
wildlife values and provide for the enhancement of the recreational values associated therewith” did
not create a federal reserved water right for these purposes).

United States v. State of Idaho, 23 P.3d 117, 126 (Idaho 2001) (“The United States
has not shown that the principal objects of the reservations will be defeated without a reserved
water right.”).
166

State ex rel. Greely v. Water Court of State of Montana, 691 P.2d 833 (Mont. 1984); State
ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 712 P.2d 754,
756 (Mont. 1985).
167

168

Strong, supra note 157, at 14.

169

Confederated Salish and Kootenai, 712 P.2d at 756.

Id. at 758. The court also decided that a Montana constitutional provision expressing
Congressional control over Indian lands within the State did not preclude inclusion of tribes in the
general adjudication proceeding. Id. at 762.
170

171

Id. at 762–66.

Id. at 766– 68. The court stated: “Federal reserved water rights differ from Indian reserved
water rights in origin, ownership, determination of priority date, the manner in which the purpose
of the reservation is determined, and quantification standards.” Id. at 766.
172
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In 2007, the Montana Supreme Court considered whether the State could
process a change of a state water right used by non-Indians on an Indian reservation
before the tribes’ reserved water rights were quantified.173 The court overruled the
district court’s denial of this authority and remanded for consideration of state
authority based on the court’s analysis of tribal and state sovereignty.174 Previously,
the court had denied the State’s authority to issue new permits to use water from
sources within the Flathead Reservation because new uses would necessarily
interfere with the Tribes’ reserved water rights.175 In response to the first of these
decisions, the Montana legislature amended the State’s Water Use Act to allow
permitting to move forward pending completion of the State’s adjudication
process.176 The Montana Supreme Court determined this provision could not
authorize new permits for water uses on Indian reservations until Indian reserved
rights were quantified.177 Nevertheless, the Montana Department of Natural
Resources and Conservation (DNRC) proposed to issue another permit for a
new use on the Flathead Reservation, noting that the water would come from
a groundwater source.178 Once again, the Montana Supreme Court ruled that
the DNRC could not issue permits until the Indian reserved water rights were
quantified.179 Thus, the court’s most recent decision to allow changes of water
rights represents a modification of its earlier views.180

H. A Comparison of Key Holdings
1. Implied Federal Reserved Rights
Only three state appellate courts have considered state trial court
determinations respecting implied reserved rights for non-Indian federal land
reservations—New Mexico, Colorado, and Idaho. The New Mexico decision
was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. New Mexico181 and
is firmly embedded in the federal law doctrine of implied reserved rights for

173

Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Clinch, 158 P.3d 377 (Mont. 2007).

Id. at 389. Earlier the court stated: “we must inquire whether the DNRC regulatory process
at issue here would ‘threaten[ ] or ha[ve] some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.’” Id. at 387.
174

175
In The Matter of the Application for Beneficial Water Use Permits Nos. 66459-76L (Ciotti I )
923 P.2d 1073 (Mont. 1996); Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Clinch (Ciotti II ), 992 P.2d
244 (Mont. 1999); Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Stults, 59 P.3d 1093 (Mont. 2002).
176

Ciotti II, 992 P.2d at 248.

177

Id. at 250.

178

Stultz, 59 P.3d at 1053.

179

Id. at 1097.

180

Ciotti I had also involved a proposed change of use.

438 U.S. 696 (1978). This decision affirmed Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 564
P.2d 615 (N.M. 1977).
181
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non-Indian reservations. Both the Colorado and Idaho supreme courts were
asked to consider whether enactment of the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of
1960 (MUSY), which stated that national forests are to be managed for outdoor
recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes,182 created an
implied reserved water right needed to accomplish these purposes.183 In United
States v. New Mexico, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected an argument by the federal
government that MUSY merely confirmed Congress’s original intention in the
1897 Organic Act to manage national forests for these purposes.184 In Colorado,
the United States argued that MUSY itself created implied reserved rights (with
a 1960 rather than 1897 priority date) and that, since the United States had not
made this argument in New Mexico, the U.S. Supreme Court had not decided
the question.185 The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the federal government’s
arguments, noting the U.S. Supreme Court had characterized the purposes in
MUSY as secondary and thus not the basis of an implied reserved right.186 The
United States repeated its arguments in the Snake River adjudication.187 The
Idaho Supreme Court found that MUSY did not reserve land, only directed the
Forest Service respecting management of lands already reserved.188
Both the Idaho and Colorado supreme courts found federal reserved rights
established under the 1926 executive order, Public Water Reserve No. 107.189
The executive order itself stated its purpose was to reserve water located in
springs and water holes on these public lands for “public use.”190 The Colorado
Supreme Court decided these reservations were for “the purposes of human and
animal consumption in the amount necessary to prevent monopolization of the
water resources.”191 The Idaho Supreme Court found the sole purpose of these
reservations to be stock watering.192

182

16 U.S.C. § 528.

United States v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982); United States v. City
of Challis, 988 P.2d 1125 (Colo. 1999).
183

184
New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 715 (“Without legislative history to the contrary, we are led to
conclude that Congress did not intend in enacting the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 to
reserve water for the secondary purposes there established.”).
185

Denver, 656 P.2d at 24.

186

Id. 25–26.

187

Challis, 988 P.2d at 1204.

Id. at 1205. Such a conclusion raises a fundamental doctrinal question—are implied reserved
rights only based on the original law under which land reservations were made or can subsequent
enactments/federal actions also imply the reservation of water necessary for their achievement.
188

189

Denver, 656 P.2d at 33; United States v. State of Idaho, 959 P.2d 449, 450 (Idaho 1998).

190

State of Idaho, 959 P.2d at 451.

191

Denver, 656 P.2d at 32.

State of Idaho, 959 P.2d at 453 (“We hold that PWR 107 is a valid basis for a federal
reserved water right for the limited purpose of stockwatering.”).
192
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In addition, the Idaho Supreme Court determined that designation of already
reserved lands as wilderness under the 1964 Wilderness Act did not create any
implied reserved rights.193 Initially, the trial court ruled that Idaho wilderness areas
held reserved rights that effectively reserved all unappropriated water still available
at the time of their designation.194 On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld
this finding.195 The court noted that national forests designated as wilderness areas
no longer can serve the original purpose of providing a continuous supply of
timber.196 As a result, the court found the primary purpose of such area is changed
to wilderness preservation.197 That purpose, the court concluded, requires the
reservation of all unappropriated water at the date of the reservation.198
A year later, the court reversed itself and determined that wilderness areas do
not hold implied federal reserved water rights.199 It reached this conclusion on
the basis that the purposes of the Wilderness Act (“these shall be administered for
the use and enjoyment of the American people in such manner as will leave them
unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to provide for
the protection of these areas, the preservation of their wilderness character”200)
would not be defeated without the reservation of water.201 In the court’s view,
the purpose of the Wilderness Act is to “prevent the development of land within
the designated wilderness areas and to preserve those lands in their natural state
for future generations.”202 Preservation of the wilderness ensures there will be no
development of water within wilderness areas. Therefore, the court concluded,
there is no need for a reserved water right.203 As to uses of water outside of
wilderness areas (upstream),204 the court denied that the Wilderness Act could
extend outside wilderness areas to preclude or regulate them.205 In sum, the court

193

Challis, 988 P.2d 1125 (1999).

194

In re SRBA, Case No. 39576—Wilderness Reserved Claims, 1999 WL 778325, at 1.

195

Id. at 8.

196

Id. at 5.

197

Id. at 6.

198

Id. at 9.

199

Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260 (Idaho 2000).

200

16 U.S.C. § 1131(a).

Potlatch, 12 P.3d at 1266 (“There is no language in the Wilderness Act compelling the
conclusion that there must be reserved water rights to fulfill the purposes of the Act.”).
201

202

Id.

203

Id. at 1267.

The Frank Church Wilderness Area is located downstream from streams with state-lawbased appropriations. Blumm, supra note 160, at 187.
204

205

According to the court:
If all naturally flowing waters since the designation of the respective wilderness areas
were reserved, appropriations made since the wilderness areas were designated would
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stated: “A clear indication of the creation of implied water rights as claimed by
the United States does not exist in the language of the Wilderness Act or in its
legislative history.”206
In its decision regarding the Sawtooth National Recreation Area, the Idaho
Supreme Court decided that a reservation “to assure the preservation and protection
of the natural, scenic, historic, pastoral, and fish and wildlife values and provide
for the enhancement of the recreational values associated therewith”207 did not
create an implied reserved right.208 Determining that the statutory language is
ambiguous, the court decided the primary purpose of the reservation is to regulate
development and mining.209 It then concluded that these purposes can be achieved
without a reservation of water.210
The Idaho Supreme Court followed a similar approach in denying reserved
rights for a wildlife refuge.211 The executive orders establishing this refuge stated
that the lands (islands in the Snake River) were to serve “as a refuge and breeding
ground for migratory birds and other wildlife . . . .”212 In its examination of the
history behind the executive orders, the court determined the underlying “purpose
was to create sanctuaries for migratory birds to protect them from hunters and
trappers so they would not become extinct and so they could continue to benefit
husbandry.”213 While an island is, by definition, land surrounded by water, the
court emphasized its view of the difficulties of quantifying the necessary amount
of water and suggested that this problem of quantification had also been a problem
in finding a reservation of water for wilderness areas.214 It concluded that an island
would still be a sanctuary without water so that refuge purposes would not be
entirely defeated without a reserved water right.215
be defeated, and future appropriations of waters that would flow into the wilderness
would be precluded. There is nothing within the Wilderness Act that indicates that
this is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act.
Potlatch, 12 P.3d at 1267.
206

Id. at 1268.

207

16 U.S.C. § 460aa.

208

Potlatch, 12 P.3d at 1287.

209

Id. at 1289.

210

Id. at 1290–91.

United States v. State of Idaho, 23 P.3d 117 (Idaho 2001) (Deer Flats National
Wildlife Refuge).
211

The refuge is a consolidation of two areas established under separate executive orders but
both declaring the same purpose of the reservation. Id. at 122.
212

213

Id. at 125.

Id. (“there is no standard for the amount of water necessary to have an island”). The court
cited to its statement in Potlatch that “[a]bsence of any standard for quantification is indicative of
the fact that quantification was not meant to be determined.” Potlatch, 12 P.3d at 1287.
214

215

State of Idaho, 23 P.3d at 126.
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In sum, two state courts have held that MUSY did not create implied
reserved rights for the additional national forest purposes of recreation and fish
and wildlife—one based on how the U.S. Supreme Court had already decided
the issue, and another on the basis that MUSY did not reserve lands.216 These
same two state courts found that PWR107 had reserved water—one for stock
watering and domestic use and the other only for stock watering.217 The Idaho
Court has decided that the purposes of wilderness areas, national recreation areas,
and national wildlife refuges do not require water for their achievement.218 In the
process, it has suggested that courts are free to go beyond the purposes stated in
the federal reservation action to discover more specific purposes that might not
require the reservation of water for their accomplishment.219 It has concluded that
the absence of a clear quantification standard demonstrates a lack of intention to
reserve water.220 In dicta, it has suggested a reserved water right could not extend
upstream to prevent a junior appropriative right.221

2. Indian Reserved Water Rights
The question has arisen, either directly or indirectly, whether the U.S.
Supreme Court decisions respecting federal reserved rights are applicable in cases
involving Indian reserved water rights. The Montana Supreme Court has provided
the most extensive discussion of this issue, concluding that the two categories of
reserved rights are distinct.222 Respecting ownership, the court declared that the
United States is the trustee, not the owner of Indian reserved water rights.223
The United States is, however, the owner of federal reserved water rights and
“can lease, sell, quitclaim, release, encumber or convey its own federal reserved
water rights.”224 Respecting quantification, the court noted federal reserved rights
are to be the minimum necessary to achieve the primary purpose of the land
reservation narrowly construed, while Indian reserved rights are to achieve broadly
the purposes of Indian self-sufficiency that were the basis for establishing the
Indian reservation.225 The Arizona Supreme Court took a very similar approach,

216

See supra notes 182–88 and accompanying text.

217

See supra notes 189–92 and accompanying text.

218

See supra notes 190–203 and accompanying text.

219

See supra notes 202–15 and accompanying text.

220

See supra note 214 and accompanying text.

221

See supra note 205 and accompanying text.

State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation,
712 P.2d 754, 766–68 (Mont. 1985).
222

223

Id. at 767.

Id. The court suggested such disposition may not be possible for national parks and
wilderness areas.
224

225

Id. at 767–68.
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noting that while the purposes of federal non-Indian reservations are to be viewed
strictly, the purposes of Indian reservations are to be understood broadly.226 It
followed the Montana Supreme Court in saying that federal reserved rights are
freely transferable.227 It agreed with the Montana court that Indian reservations
are established for the purpose of making possible Indian self-sufficiency.228 The
Arizona Supreme Court explicitly rejected application of New Mexico’s primary/
secondary purpose distinction.229 By comparison, the Wyoming Supreme Court
in the Big Horn adjudication seemed to follow this distinction in its discussion
of the purposes of the Wind River Reservation.230 The Wyoming Supreme Court
found that the primary purpose of the Wind River Reservation was agriculture,
pointing to references in the treaty to this issue.231
Wyoming and Arizona courts also have reached different conclusions
respecting whether groundwater can be the source of supplying a reserved water
right. While acknowledging the “logic” of potentially using groundwater to satisfy
reserved rights, the Wyoming Supreme Court noted the absence of decisions
supporting this proposition and ended by stating categorically that “the reserved
water doctrine does not extend to groundwater . . . .”232 The Arizona Supreme
Court concluded the water necessary to supply a reserved water right may “come
from whatever particular sources each reservation had at hand.”233
Just as state courts have reached different conclusions respecting the purposes
for which Indian reservations were established, so too have they differed in their
approaches to quantification. Wyoming adopted the practicably irrigable acreage

In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and
Source, 35 P.3d 68 (Ariz. 2001).
226

227

Id. at 73–74.

Id. at 74 (quoting State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the
Flathead Reservation, 712 P.2d 754, 768 (Mont. 1985)).
228

Id. at 76; see also Federal Reserved Rights, supra note 11, at § 36.02 (“Thus, for non-Indian
reservations, water is reserved only for the primary purposes of reservations, not for secondary
purposes. Further, the burden of proof is on the government to show that without water, the
reservation’s primary purpose would be entirely defeated. Whether these principles apply to Indian
reserved rights, the Court has never said.”).
229

In re The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System, 753 P.2d 76, 96 (Wyo. 1988) (Big Horn I ) (discussing the use of the “specific purpose” test
from New Mexico in the Ninth Circuit’s Colville decision respecting Indian reserved water rights).
230

231

Id. at 97.

232

Id. at 99–100.

In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and
Source, 989 P.2d 739, 747 (1999).
233
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standard.234 Arizona chose to apply what it called a “multiple factor analysis.”235
Wyoming decided the State Engineer should “monitor” decreed Indian reserved
water rights, while Washington apparently relies on courts.236 The Wyoming
Supreme Court also has rejected the ability of tribes with decreed reserved rights
for future agricultural water use to change those rights to instream flow purposes,
though the precise legal basis for this decision is unclear.237

IV. Summary
Allowing state courts to determine federal and tribal water rights is an
experiment that has failed.238 While the courts endeavor to consistently apply
federal law, they are inevitably affected by their position as state courts. They are
subject to state political influences.239 They are often sensitive to the potential
adverse effects of newly decreed senior reserved water rights on junior water users
with rights established under state law. Whether consciously or not, they may well
tend to apply federal law in a way that produces results protective of state interests
and constrictive of federal interests. It is difficult, in reading many of these state
court decisions, not to be aware of the explicit or implicit hostility toward reserved

234

Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 100–01.

In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and
Source, 35 P.3d 68, 79 (Ariz. 2001).
235

236
The Wyoming Supreme Court in Big Horn I used the term “monitoring” while upholding
the trial court’s decree under which disputes between Indian and non-Indian water users on the
Wind River Reservation were first to be addressed by the State Engineer. Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at
115 (“The decree only requires the United States and the Tribes first to turn to the state engineer
to exercise his authority over the state users to protect their reserved water rights before they seek
court assistance to enforce their rights; it does not preclude access to the courts.”). The source for
Washington’s approach is Mirage, supra note 126, at 1181–82.
237
See In re The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System, 835 P.2d 273, 301–04 (Wyo. 1992).
238

See also McElroy & Davis, supra note 10, at 600–01 (footnotes omitted):
Examination of the resulting state court litigation over the nature and extent
of tribal water rights reveals that the adjudication of Indian reserved water rights has
occurred in distinct proceedings which could have been conducted in federal court
and then integrated into the state court proceedings. Moreover, the state courts have
not shown any unique ability to address the complicated substantive and procedural
issues that are involved in the determination of Indian reserved rights. In addition,
there are lingering concerns that the state courts are ill-equipped to deal with the
political pressures arrayed against tribal efforts to reclaim water that may have been
used by the non-Indian community for many years. Finally, there are frequent
indications that tribes, the United States, and the states are weary of the fray and are
beginning to question the incredible outlay of resources required for such massive
adjudications. For example, in Arizona, the parties have struggled for the last ten to
fifteen years just to establish a procedure to deal with the complexities of the federal
rights of the United States and Indian tribes.

239

See Blumm, supra note 160, at 182–98.
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rights they often display. Put simply, the diversity of courts considering these
matters has generated a diversity of results. And the promise of oversight by the
U.S. Supreme Court to sort out these issues has proven illusory.240 It is time to
remove this authority from state general adjudication courts.
The problem begins with the McCarran Amendment and its adoption of
the general adjudication model as the forum to determine federal water rights.
The use of general adjudications to determine water rights arose in an era in
which there were no reliable records of claims to use water and, thus, no means
of resolving conflicts between users except litigation.241 Since no uses had been
validated through some state process, the idea emerged of having all users joined
simultaneously in a single proceeding in which priorities and diversion amounts
would be fixed.242 Most states subsequently developed special processes under
which new water uses had to be established, processes requiring the issuance
of a permit to authorize initiation of an appropriation. These processes ended
with some kind of official determination that the authorized beneficial use had
been achieved and, thus, that the right had vested.243 Only a few states such as
Wyoming, however, used this process to certify the vested status of pre-existing
uses, and some states such as Montana waited many years before establishing
any effective state supervision of new uses.244 Because of the large number of
undetermined water uses in some states, statutes authorized the institution of a
general adjudication proceeding in state courts to determine priorities and enable
resolution of disputes.245
But the surge in use of GSAs in recent times is largely related to the desire
to determine federal and Indian reserved water rights in state court. The result
has been decades-long proceedings in multiple western states that have been
enormously expensive to all participants and that, aside from determining federal
and Indian claims, have accomplished little more than finally establishing an
official priority date and diversion right for uses that pre-existed state supervision

240
The only state court general adjudication that has been reviewed and decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court on the merits was the New Mexico proceeding for the Rio Mimbres. See United
States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
241

Rethinking, supra note 8.

242

Id.

Id. Wyoming directed that all existing uses be determined in its administrative adjudication
process in 1890. See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Treatise on Wyoming Water Law 12–13 (2014).
243

244

Rethinking, supra note 8. Montana did not put in place a permitting system until 1973.

For a good summary of state adjudication processes, see A. Lynne Krogh, Water Right
Adjudications in Western States: Procedures, Constitutionality, Problems & Solutions, 30 Land &
Water L. Rev. 9 (1995).
245
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of new uses.246 It is probably not legally necessary to use GSAs simply to validate
the existence of uses established under state law and, aside from the influence of
the McCarran Amendment, it is certainly not necessary to use GSAs to determine
the existence and scope of federal and Indian reserved rights.247
How can we disentangle ourselves from this unfortunate situation? Perhaps
most straightforward would be for Congress to amend the McCarran Amendment
by limiting its waiver of federal sovereign immunity to determination of uses of
water based on state law.248 An alternative would be for the U.S. Supreme Court
to reconsider its view that federal and Indian reserved rights can be determined in
GSAs. The Court’s decisions turned heavily on notions of judicial efficiency and,
perhaps, federalism. In part, this view seems to be based on the assumption that
water right determinations should be made in general adjudication processes.249
This assumption is based on the mistaken notion that all water users from the
same source of supply need to be party to the proceeding, that the process is
fundamentally adversarial, and that it is fair for the United States and tribes
to have to go through the same process as all other users of water from the
same source.
Moreover, we now have substantial experience with state court determination
of federal and Indian reserved rights. This experience tends to bear out the concerns
expressed in the dissents to Colorado River District and San Carlos Apache.250
Justice Marshall, for example, dismissed concerns of duplicative proceedings

By far the most comprehensive treatment of GSAs in the west is found in two lengthy
articles published in 2005 and 2006. John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of
Adjudicating Rivers and Streams Part I, 8 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 355 (2005); John E. Thorson et
al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers and Streams Part II, 9 U. Denv. Water
L. Rev. 299 (2006).
246

247
See Rethinking, supra note 8, for the argument that GSAs are not necessary to determine
the priority and extent of uses established under state law. The priority and extent of an appropriative
water right are based on actions of the individual appropriator and are totally independent of the
existence of other uses of water from the same source. Their determination is based on the specific
facts of the appropriation—the date the appropriation was initiated, the diligence with which water
was placed to beneficial use, and the requirements of the use. None of these considerations is in
any way dependent on the existence of other uses. Similarly, the existence and scope of federal and
Indian reserved rights are determined based on the particular facts associated with the reservation of
land, not on the existence of other water uses from the same source of supply.
248
Arguably, this was Congress’s original intent. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
For the reasons expressed in Rethinking, supra note 8, however, the amendment should remove
the requirement of a general adjudication and simply direct that determinations of federal water
use rights based on state law must be established under state law, as with Section 8 of the 1902
Reclamation Act. 43 U.S.C. § 383.
249
See, e.g., Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983) (“But
water rights adjudication is a virtually unique type of proceeding, and the McCarran Amendment is
a virtually unique federal statute, and we cannot in this context be guided by general propositions.”).
250

See supra notes 73, 75 and accompanying text.
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by noting that federal district courts need only decide the matter of federal and
Indian reserved rights.251 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, presciently
noted the important uncertainties remaining in the law of reserved rights and the
importance of having these issues determined in the federal court system with
its opportunities for appellate review.252 Justice Stevens further noted the great
difference in the legal issues to be considered in determining federal and Indian
reserved water rights, a difference that would, he accurately predicted, result in
separate proceedings within the state adjudication process to determine these
rights.253 Now added to these valid concerns is the experience with state court
determinations, a decidedly mixed experience with sometimes directly conflicting
results that are not being addressed through U.S. Supreme Court review, and
with prominent examples of exactly the kinds of concerns expressed about
expecting state courts to evenhandedly decide matters that are perceived as
favoring federal or tribal interests at the expense of local concerns.254 For all these
reasons it is time to return determination of federal and Indian reserved water
rights to federal courts.

251

San Carlos Apache, 463 U.S. at 572 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

Id. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Not all of the issues arising from the application of
the Winters doctrine have been resolved, because in the past the scope of Indian reserved rights has
infrequently been adjudicated. The important task of elaborating and clarifying these federal law
issues in the cases now before the Court, and in future cases, should be performed by federal rather
than state courts whenever possible.”).
252

Id. (“Federal adjudication of Indian water rights would not fragment an otherwise unified
state court proceeding. Since Indian reserved claims are wholly dissimilar to state-law water claims,
and since their amount does not depend on the total volume of water available in the water source
or on the quantity of competing claims, it will be necessary to conduct separate proceedings to
determine these claims even if the adjudication takes place in state court. Subsequently the state
court will incorporate these claims—like claims under state law or federal Government claims
that have been formally adjudicated in the past—into a single inclusive, binding decree for each
water source.”).
253

254
The Idaho Supreme Court’s reversal of its decision respecting wilderness water rights is the
most prominent example (see supra note 199), but other decisions reflect that same problem. See,
e.g., In re The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 835
P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992) (denying the tribe’s right to use its reserved rights for instream flows).
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